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INTRODUCTION 
AT LEAST 3 strands of research form the background of this paper: 
f \ the study of the emergence of francophone engineering in 
-Z ^.Quebec, at the Ecole Polytechnique (Gagnon, 1991); the history 
of all engineers operating in Quebec, at the Université de Montréal 
(Guédon & Langford, 1993); and the authors' immediate involve­
ments with ongoing research in energy and public enterprise at CRED­
IT (Centre for Research in Industrial and Technological Development), 
at the Université du Québec à Montréal (e.g., Niosi et al., 1988; 
Faucher & Bergeron, 1986). The particular aims of this project have 
been to obtain the perspective of key actors in the enormous changes 
in Montreal-based consulting engineering, from the founding of 
Hydro-Québec in 1944 to the still turbulent present, and to elucidate 
the complex relationships among some of the principal firms, and 
between these firms and Hydro-Québec. For this purpose, ten engi­
neers were interviewed at length, principally in 1989 and 1990, with 
up-dates necessitated by events in 1991 and 1992. This research was 
made possible by the existence of the Shell Canada Montreal Oral 
History Project at Concordia University Libraries' Non-print Division, 
administered by Loren Lerner. 
All would agree that the public enterprise founded in 1944 by the 
government assumption of control over the Montreal Light Heat & 
Power Company and enlarged in 1962-1963 by the purchase of the 
Shawinigan and other water and power companies had a transforma-
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tional effect on the nature and direction of engineering and indeed all 
technical occupations in Quebec and particularly in its metropolis. 
Among the strongest themes that emerged from the engineers' discus­
sion of the recent evolution of Montreal consulting engineering are 
the following: 
1 The rise to comparative dominance of francophone (and multilin­
gual) firms since the late 1950's and early 1960's; 
2 The high relative importance of hydroelectric power engineering, 
with special reference to the political, economic, social, and ecolog­
ical issues raised by phase I of the James Bay project of the 1970's; 
3 Growth (or survival) by means of the employee-owned firm; 
4 Evolution from design and specification service to total service and 
project management, and to increased flexibility in recombination 
of firms; 
5 Formation of strategic alliances (joint ventures, acquisition of sub­
sidiaries, consortia, and mergers). 
The first two themes concern the specific environment of Quebec, 
with emphasis on Montreal as its metropolis; the remaining three 
reflect global changes in the nature of consulting engineering firms 
and projects, and while the details are fascinating, Montreal's experi­
ence is hardly unique. 
In this article, therefore, we will concentrate on the first two 
themes: the rise of francophone engineering, with the concomitant 
decline in relative importance of the anglophone firms; and the 
nature and great importance for Quebec of hydroelectric engineering 
projects, highlighted by the symbolic, almost mythical, as well as eco­
nomic, significance of such projects as the Manicouagan-Outardes in 
the 1950's, on the north shore of the St. Lawrence, and the first phase 
of the James Bay project in the 1970's. In these two areas, the 
Montreal case is unique. In the first area, the cosmopolitan, previous­
ly anglo-Canadian and American-dominated metropolis was faced 
with representing not only its own largely francophone, bilingual, 
and multilingual population, but a massively francophone québécois 
hinterland, and an uneasy relationship with Canadian confederation. 
All of these particularities have affected, and have been affected by, 
the operations of these firms. 
In the second area, Quebec's geographical characteristics make 
hydroelectric energy development a more dominant economic thrust 
than in most of Canada's regions. A multiplicity of waterfalls, charac­
teristic of the Canadian Shield, almost cover its landscape. They drain 
west to Hudson's/James Bay, east to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the 
Atlantic, north from the Appalachian highands (like the St. Francis 
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and the Richelieu) and south from the shield (like the St. Maurice) to 
feed a huge artery of commerce - the St. Lawrence River - bisecting 
the most heavily populated area of Quebec and linking the entire 
Great Lakes water system of central North America with the ocean. 
In this situation, water power was developed as early here as in 
other parts of the world such as Switzerland, Norway, France, and, in 
North America, Ontario and New York state (Niagara Falls). An 
increasingly highly-developed long-distance transmission capability, 
coupled with the lure of an energy-hungry, urbanizing, northeastern 
Canada and United States market, have led generations of Quebec 
politicians to make electricity central in their economic prescriptions 
for local development, prosperity for the people - and in their quest 
for power (for industry, for cities, for homes, and for themselves and 
their parties). 
METHODOLOGY 
The choice of firms was based on length of existence and current 
importance in the field of hydroelectric engineering. The oldest, 
Montreal Engineering Company (Monenco), founded in 1907 to ser­
vice the Killam/Royal Securities Corporation utility companies, was 
always an internationally-oriented operation; its difficulties following 
Killam's death in the 1950's and the francisation movement in the 
1960's eventually led to the removal of its head office to Calgary. But 
the other three firms chosen have remained Montreal-centred as they 
expanded worldwide, and are now all part of the same firm: SNC 
(founded in 1911 by Arthur Surveyer, who was joined by another 
French Canadian and a German-Swiss, the firm being known until the 
1960's as Surveyer, Nenniger & Chenevert); Shawinigan Engineering, 
founded in 1919 to serve principally the needs of Shawinigan Water 
& Power Company; and Lavalin, founded in 1937 as Lalonde & 
Valois, as a chiefly civil engineering firm. 
The choice of key events to focus on was based on a perception of 
those events in the firms' recent histories which were most sympto­
matic of the social, economic, and political transformations going on 
in the nature of consulting engineering in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 
and the world. They were: 
1 1962: the beginning of Shawinigan Engineering's existence as an 
independent, employee-owned firm as a result of Hydro-Quebec's 
acquisition of Shawinigan Water & Power; 
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2 1972: the choice of Lavalin as the principal private Canadian par­
ticipant in the management of the James Bay project; 
3 1982: the acquisition of a financially troubled Shawinigan 
Engineering by Lavalin, which valued its extensive hydroelectric 
engineering expertise; 
4 1992: the process of merger among SNC, Lavalin, and its by-now 
subsidiary Shawinigan-Lavalin, a fusion which was precipitated by 
the financial collapse of Lavalin during the recession of the early 
1990's (August 1991). 
The choice of people took two directions: either working engineers 
whose careers exemplified the evolution of the firms, or 
engineer/administrators who had been in responsible positions during 
key moments in the history of the relationship between Hydro 
Quebec and the firms. 
The first category includes George Scruton, still a globe-trotting 
engineer although officially retired from Shawinigan-Lavalin/SNC 
Lavalin; George Denovan, a recent retiree of Shawinigan Engineering 
who had the advantage of being the son-in-law of the firm's president 
in its heyday (R.A. Heartz, who began with the firm at its creation in 
1919 and died in 1988); and Jo-Ann Paquet, a recent graduate of Laval 
in metallurgical engineering, veteran of Alcan and Qualisys, who is 
now in charge of "total quality management" in the merger process 
by which Shawinigan-Lavalin and SNC's divisions of energy and 
megaprojects (grands travaux, or great works, in French) are being 
fused into a new division of SNC-Lavalin, which is called SNC-
Shawinigan. 
The second category includes some of the best-known names in the 
recent history of Quebec engineering. First of all, Robert A. Boyd, a 
francophone graduate of Ecole Polytechnique and employee of 
Hydro-Québec at its founding in 1944, managed the merging of per­
sonnel when Shawinigan Water & Power and other companies were 
brought under one roof in 1963, and was president of the Société 
d'énergie de la Baie James (SEBJ) and thus primus inter pares of the 
committee managing James Bay 1, and president of Hydro Quebec 
from 1977 to 1981. 
From the senior firm of the three-in-one Montreal giant of today, 
we interviewed Camille Dagenais, who led the transformation of SNC 
into a world-class worldwide engineering firm; and his successor as 
president, Jean-Paul Gourdeau. (Time prevented interviewing the cur­
rent [1992] president of SNC-Lavalin, Guy Saint-Pierre, who would 
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also have a wide perspective, having served as an engineer, as a 
Liberal cabinet minister in the early 1970's, and as president of 
Ogilvie Flour Mills before taking his present position.) 
As for the two premier anglophone firms in the hydroelectric field, 
Shawinigan Engineering was represented by two senior engineers, 
(Scruton and Denovan, mentioned above); and in the case of 
Monenco, by J.K.C. Mulherin, its last Montreal-based president. 
The most recent, and in many ways the most successful firm in 
pan-Canadian terms, has been Lavalin. Three prime movers were 
identified: Bernard Lamarre, son-in-law of a founder, who guided the 
firm's expansion through the post-Duplessis exuberance of the 
Quebec economy in the 1960's, and the diversification of the 1970's, 
and is currently consultant to the president of SNC-Lavalin; Marcel 
Dufour, longtime president of the subsidiary firm National Boring and 
Sounding/Compagnie de Forage et Sondage, and until recently presi­
dent of Lavalin International; and Armand Couture, who participated 
in innovative projects of the 1960's (e.g., the Louis-Hippolyte 
Lafontaine Tunnel in Montreal), represented Lavalin on the commit­
tee of management for James Bay and the negotiations with the Crée 
culminating in the James Bay Agreement of 1975, managed and 
presided over the merger of Shawinigan Engineering with Lavalin in 
1982, and became, as of September 1, 1992, president and chief oper­
ating officer of Hydro-Québec. 
THEME I: THE COMPARATIVE RISE OF FRANCOPHONE FIRMS 
The purchase of the Shawinigan Water and Power by Hydro Quebec 
in December 1962 is often seen as a symbol of the Quiet Revolution, 
but it was part of a much longer and less mythologized historical 
process (Paquet, 1988). This company, founded in 1898 by Montreal, 
New York and Boston interests, transformed the city of Shawinigan 
(then called Shawinigan Falls) from a forest village to an industrial 
centre. The three industries lured there to take advantage of cheap 
abundant power were Belgo-Canadian Pulp & Paper (later 
Consolidated Bathurst); Northern Reduction Company (later Alcan), 
and Shawinigan Carbide, later Shawinigan Chemicals, acquired by 
Gulf Oil (U.S.) as a consequence of the events of 1962. Originally a 
dynamic and innovative force for provincial development, the 
Shawinigan Water & Power firm gradually became smug in its own 
leadership position in Quebec hydroelectricity, and the object of 
resentment of those fighting the "electricity trust" in the 1930's 
(Langford, 1988). Hydro-Quebec was founded in 1944, taking over the 
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even more arrogant Montreal Light Heat and Power Company; by 
1962 Shawinigan was the largest private electric power utility (16.5%), 
exceeded only by Hydro Quebec (35%) and by Mean (27.5%), which 
used most of the power it produced, as well as serving as the general 
utility in the Saguenay area, where its largest operations relocated in 
the 1920's. 
The mythical nature of perceptions of the takeovers of 1962-63 is 
connected with the dramatic circumstances under which the Lesage 
government of Quebec, with René Lévesque as Minister of Natural 
Resources, called an election on this issue only two years after its orig­
inal mandate in 1960, and won. The passions aroused, and their ori­
gins, are demonstrated by two incidents of early 1962. René Lévesque 
recalled in his memoirs the question of a whisky-laden redhead in a 
Westmount home where he had been invited following a meeting: 
"But Lévesque, how can people like you imagine you can run 
Shawinigan Water and Power?" (Lévesque, 1986). Another historian 
recounts a similar question put by a Shawinigan Water & Power par­
ticipant in a meeting Lévesque had called to discuss ways of rational­
izing Quebec's power distribution system. Lévesque's response was 
accompanied by a blow of his fist which broke the glass top of his 
desk (Thomson, 1984). Soon afterwards he persuaded the cabinet to 
let him push forward with the process of acquiring control of the elec­
trical system; and the decision to conduct an election was taken at a 
cabinet retreat in September 1962. 
In practical terms, the power company purchases by Hydro Quebec 
in 1962-63 was part of an ongoing effort to make the electrical system 
more efficient, and to improve the lot of francophones in technical 
and management positions. For the engineering firms under discus­
sion, it signalled a lack of government business coming the way of 
Shawinigan Engineering, and more generally, an increased hiring of 
private francophone firms to do contract work for Hydro Quebec and 
other government clients. 
SNC had a long history of totally bilingual management, with 
strong European and other foreign components. This is reflected in 
the following quotation (references in long quotations are to Langford 
& DeBresson, 1990): 
SNC has always been a multicultural organization; I mean, we have people 
from fifty or sixty different technical backgrounds, and they are talking over 
60 languages. This was true then, because [Mr. Surveyer and] Mr. Chenevert 
[were] French Canadian, Mr. Nenniger was Swiss of German descent; [among] 
the major partners, you always had a mix. At the time, when you were working 
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MANIC S 
T h e building of t h e Daniel J o h n s o n D a m 
Lili R é t h i and Wi l l iam W . J a c o b u s 
Dustjacket of a book by the European-American artist Lili Réthi and a senior 
editor of the Engineering News-Record, which records the building process of a 
multiple-arch dam in which SNC and Acres were the major Canadian firms. 
Daniel Johnson, as premier of Quebec in 1968, was here in the bush 100 miles 
from the nearest town, Baie comeau, to dedicate the dam when he died. 
Jacobus ends his text "Manic S was done. A monument had become a memori-
al." (Manic 5 was published by Doubleday, New York, in 1971.) 
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with industry, particularly in the sixties, the language of work that you had to 
work in was English, and that was it, and that was no problem. And when we 
were working with municipalities..or the Quebec government, it was French, 
and that was no problem....We've always been in the position to work in the 
language of the client...We felt that, since we were a service company, the lan­
guage was the language of the client. Qean-Paul Gourdeau, May 1990, p.4) 
Thus spoke the chairman of SNC, the oldest Montreal consulting firm 
still in existence, whose founder in 1911, Arthur Surveyer, maintained 
close business connections in both linguistic communities. The lan-
guage of the client - it seems to be generally agreed that a major impe­
tus for the growth of consulting engineering in Montreal since 1960 
was great leap in the extent to which a francophone client, the 
Quebec government, was active in providing work. 
In Quebec, what was different [from the rest of Canada in 1960] was that the 
infrastructure had lapsed behind the times, and there was a very much needed 
catchup program that had to be instigated. Thaf s where consulting engineers 
in Quebec were favored, by working in that program, rather than increasing 
substantially the civil service. (Armand Couture, Lavalin, Sept. 1989, p.2) 
As you remember, in 1960, Mr. Lesage came to power and Duplessis had done 
almost nothing in Quebec, from the end of the war until his death, while 
Ontario and all the other provinces were really taking advantage of the low 
interest rates to build their road and dams and all kinds of things. But as 
Ontario and all the other provinces were developing, instead of farming out 
their work they were keeping it inside the administration, building up their 
own forces instead of building up consulting engineering firms on the out­
side... When Lesage came in, he had good quality personnel but they were very 
few...it was a skeleton staff in the highway department and all that...There was 
a very very big program enacted for roads, schools, hospitals, dams...He said 
that he would farm out and try to create new high technology Quebec engi­
neering firms; and because of that, we were there at a time that it was very 
easy for a young man like me to get the job, because jobs were plentiful, and 
you didn't have to be the wisest man in the world to be able to convince any­
one to give you a job...I was very lucky. (Bernard Lamarre, Lavalin, August 
1989, p.2,3) 
Bernard Lamarre was just assuming leadership from Lavalin's found­
ing partners, Lalonde and Valois, when the Quebec government 
assumed this more active role (besides some of these jobs, the firm 
grew through such federally sponsored projects as the Trans-Canada 
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highway, including the Louis-Hippolyte Lafontaine Tunnel, and pri­
vate projects such as Place Bonaventure). 
A sentiment expressed at a meeting of Quebec and Ontario engi­
neers in the 1960's illustrated the hope that the principle of farming 
out engineering would extend to Hydro Quebec as well as to the 
Quebec government itself: 
For gosh sakes don't make the same mistake as Ontario Hydro. Its engineering 
group has grown so large, if s like the universe expanding, it never stops. And 
they do their own construction, their own engineering, they have no yard­
stick to measure their efficiency by, or their proficiency; and they're adamant 
about letting anybody from the private sector interfere with that empire 
they've managed to build. God knows you don't want to do that at Hydro 
Quebec, (recalled by Douglas Denovan, Shawinigan Engineering [retired], May 
1990, p. 5) 
But the question of the "language of the client" in the case of Hydro 
Quebec was not as clear as in the regular government departments. 
Robert A. Boyd joined Hydro Quebec when its main components were 
Montreal Light Heat & Power Company and Beauhamois light Heat 
& Power Company; he presided over the welding of several more 
power companies, of which the largest was Shawinigan Water & 
Power, and 44 cooperatives, into a single entity. It was a long difficult 
process by which Hydro Quebec became a consistently francophone 
potential client for private firms, as Boyd recalls: 
In those days [1938, when Boyd entered Ecole Polytechnique] not many 
French Canadians -1 am mostly French Canadian - were going into engineer-
ing...In 19441 was the first one of a new generation, you know. And besides, it 
helped me to be bilingual, because all the previous ones were not, or almost 
not...They were all with Montreal light Heat and Beauhamois Light Heat, 
everything was done in English. [In Operations] I noticed that maybe 90% of 
the people working in the substations, the operators and people like that, were 
all French Canadians and they had to work in English; they had no instruc­
tions or guidance...what little they had was in English.. 
..So in my spare time I started writing instructions for them...in French at 
home...and my wife would help me translate. The superintending engineer..a 
Huguenot, .would take the English text, approve that, and put the French one 
in the drawer...but I continued on, and after three years he was retired and 
another English engineer succeeded; but he had learned some French and was 
much more open, so he started signing the French ones also and putting them 
out, so that was a turnaround for us [1949-50]. 
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It took time. Maybe '54, '55,1 was secretary for the engineering and planning 
committee, a big committee that planned everything in those days, and I had 
to write the minutes in English....l960 was the year, when the Lesage govern­
ment came in, and Levesque was the minister, but before that, [unofficially, it 
started; for example] a commissioner, René Dupuis, who had been dean of 
engineering at Laval [created] the first real lexique or dictionary of technical 
terms anglais-français in Hydro Quebec. 
..Manicouagan was of course the very big thing in those days [late '50's, 
early '60's], and that's where the Quebec firms [SNC, ABBDL] started to play a 
very important role if you're talking about consulting engineering. Before that 
- like Beauharnois and the others, it had been firms from outside of Quebec, 
like Acres...SNC got a large dam at Manic 5...ABBDL - Asselin, Benoit, 
Boucher, [Ducharme, Lapointe] - which is still a big firm, they got the power­
houses... and then a little bit later, after Churchill Falls there, a group from 
Acres formed RSW, Rousseau Sauvé Warren, and they are still, you know, the 
three big firms in hydroelectric; and then Lavalin of today...they got the big 
boost when they were hired...as a partner in James Bay. (Robert Boyd, Hydro 
Quebec [retired], Aug. 1989, pp. 1-3) 
As for anglophone consulting engineering firms in Montreal, they like 
the francophone firms were generally small in size in the post-war 
period (Douglas Denovan remembers a typical project as being the 
Royal Montreal golf course sprinkler system); their numbers were 
approximately equal in the 1960's, while in the 1980's they were 
about one fourth as numerous as francophone firms. (This is based on 
a quick survey of the names in the directories of the Association of 
Consulting Engineers of Canada and the Association des ingénieurs-
conseils du Québec.) There were exceptions: large engineering and 
construction firms such as Fenco (once part of Foundation Company 
of Canada, later part of Lavalin). 
In power engineering (hydroelectric and other) the two leaders 
were Montreal Engineering and Shawinigan Engineering, established 
in 1907 and 1919 respectively. But neither of these was in the general 
consulting business until the end of World War II. One served the 
engineering needs of the Canadian and international power compa­
nies held by I.W. Killam's Royal Securities Corporation; the other 
served the Shawinigan Water and Power Company. Both began to 
work for other clients before circumstances removed their parent/mar­
ket. Both went through complex "weaning" periods to establish them­
selves as independent consultants, Montreal Engineering's more 
extended and less traumatic than Shawinigan's. Both found their 
pasts both a blessing (in engineering reputation and experience) and a 
curse (in lack of marketing experience). And both, by the end of the 
Scientia canadensis 85 
eighties, were under the control of other firms (Shawinigan was 
acquired by Lavalin in 1982; in 1988 a controlling 45% interest in 
Monenco was acquired by Majestic Contractors, a subsidiary of Perini 
Corporation, Massachusetts; it has since been re-Canadianized by 
Agra in Calgary). 
Although Montreal Engineering did outside work earlier (Operation 
Habbakuk during World War II, which explored the possibility of air­
craft carriers made of ice and wood pulp; federally sponsored power 
supply for mines in the North West Territories; Iron Ore Company of 
Canada in northern Quebec, for example), the company's indepen­
dence was precipitated by the death of Izaak Walton Killam in 1955 
and the breakup of his empire of power companies in western 
Canada, the Maritimes, the Caribbean and Latin America. The blow 
was cushioned by long term contracts with its members, ending about 
1970. But the difficulties of the weaning process were evident in the 
changeover of leadership from company officers who were also power 
company officers (Gaherty et al. below) to its new leadership under 
Chris Ritchie in the 1960's, as J.K.C. Mulherin recalls: 
During the Gaherty-Krug-Thompson-Stairs regime, their interests were far 
more in protecting the interests of their power companies, and I would say 
almost to the point of minimizing the profits of Montreal Engineering, in the 
interest of keeping the cost to the power companies down. The change of 
direction, of course, was that we wanted to deal with these people on a com­
mercial basis, just as though we were any other consultant. And also, they 
weren't too keen about our taking on too much what they called "outside" 
projects because they didn't want the good people diverted from their projects 
to outside projects. (f.K.C. Mulherin, Monenco, May 1990, p.4) 
Shawinigan Engineering originally had a smaller sphere of opera­
tions: the many power sites of the St. 
Maurice River and other parts of Quebec served by Shawinigan Water 
& Power subsidiaries: 
Initially we were loaded to capacity by handling the demands of the 
Shawinigan Water & Power Company for new generating stations, transmis­
sion substations, and transmission lines...As the sites became more marginal 
and as we were running out of water rights, Dr. Heartz [president from 1951] 
had the vision to see that perhaps we'd better start increasing our 
market He had the reputation, he knew people in Canada in the engineer­
ing field; he was well known because of his wartime contribution, you know: 
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he worked for the wartime maritime shipbuilding effort of H.R. Macmillan of 
Macmillan Bloedel that built all the liberty ships down here for the war effort. 
He was permitted to leave his job with Shawinigan Engineering - you know 
CD. Howe had all these dollar-a-year men. That's what these big companies 
did for the war effort - they let some of their best men go into these wartime 
corporations, in planning and managing and expediting positions, and they 
did a fantastic job...When you get into something like that, you meet a lot of 
people ...all across Canada, and in England, and in all the [allied] countries. 
And so Dr. Heartz became knowledgeable of all these people...and of course 
this reputation that Shawinigan had for..performance... all this brought elec­
trical business to light: [B.C. Electric; Alcan; New Brunswick Power; and Brinco 
at Churchill Falls]...but unfortunately we didn't do that design, because when 
it became ready for development, we had just been nationalized by the 
Quebec government. (Douglas Denovan, Shawinigan Engineering, p.3) 
Although Shawinigan Engineering had broadened its clientele before 
1962, it suffered, in the view of Denovan and others, from the lack of 
foresight shown by Shawinigan Water & Power. Refusing to believe in 
the possibility of its being taken over, the company had neglected to 
take any steps to smoothe the path of its non-electrical subsidiaries in 
such an eventuality. In quick succession, Shawinigan Engineering 
found itself the property of the Quebec government , Power 
Corporation, and finally its own employees; it had lost its major 
client and was in an uneasy political position in Quebec where its 
activity had been concentrated. 
Although Montreal Engineering, and to a lesser extent Shawinigan 
Engineering, grew and diversified both technologically and geographi­
cally in the 1970's, some problems due to lack of marketing experi­
ence were acknowledged. As Denovan said, "The trouble with some of 
the people in Shawinigan Engineering in those days was, they were 
damn good engineers, but they weren't very good businessmen; in 
fact, most of us were in that category." (p.4) Mulherin conceded that 
Montreal Engineering had "absolutely the same problem. Never had 
to go out and find work until the last [few] years." (p.5) 
In assessing the reasons for Lavalin's takeover of Shawinigan in 
1982, Couture noted the synergy between Lavalin's experience of the 
management of hydroelectric projects, and Shawinigan's experience 
in the actual design. (Couture, p. 7) But as for why Shawinigan was up 
for sale, Marcel Dufour harked back to its historical handicap: 
Shawinigan...were not used to running after the work, the contracts. They 
were used to being given by Shawinigan Water and Power anything they 
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needed. They were good engineers, but I don't think they had good commer­
cial people...They were sitting down and waiting for the work to come to 
them by itself. 
During these years there were quite a lot of changes in the firms of consulting 
engineering - the last 25 or 30 years, the engineers started to run madly to get 
jobs. And at the time you were sitting in your office and waiting for somebody 
to give you a job, you know, just like a doctor. But this is not like that today. I 
remember Mr. Valois used to tell us over here: "Nobody will come to you in 
your office; you don't need a big office because nobody will come to give you 
a job in your office; you have to go to his office to get the job." (Marcel 
Dufour, Lavalin, Sept. 1989, pp.7-8) 
George Scruton said of his firm between the late '60's and early '80's, 
"We existed, we flourished to a certain extent, but we got into finan­
cial problems when we tried to get into some very large projects that 
did not materialize. Around 1982, the banks foreclosed and we sought 
an association with Lavalin." (George Scruton, Shawinigan/Lavalin, 
July 1989, p.5) 
All of the major engineering firms expanded outside Quebec and 
outside Canada between the sixties and the eighties; it was a frustra­
tion to the anglophone firms that they did little business in Quebec. 
Mulherin of Montreal Engineering said, "We as anglophones could 
not get any business from the province of Quebec, particularly Hydro 
Quebec [except through the Monenco subsidiary La Société 
d'Ingénierie Cartier]" (p.3) One of the greatest difficulties during his 
presidency, 1974-1990, was "in trying to deal with the problem here 
in Quebec. That was really, you know, the biggest source of puzzle­
ment: how the hell could we counteract that?" (p.6) 
Denovan of Shawinigan Engineering remembered early efforts to 
get francophone students from McGill and Ecole Polytechnique, but 
they would work only as summer students, and would not return after 
graduation. "There was one, Marc Benoit, when I joined in '48; he was 
my [first] boss, [but] Marc left to form his own firm: Asselin, Benoit, 
Boucher, Ducharme, Lapointe." (p.4) (Marcel Dufour of Lavalin also 
worked briefly for Shawinigan Engineering.) It seems clear that fran­
cophone engineers in the immdediate post- World War II period 
found the atmosphere of anglophone firms uncongenial. Scruton con­
cludes: "I think., that to exist in the Montreal context the firm must 
be French speaking, and although we tried, as an essentially English 
speaking firm, to become French speaking, it's only with the associa­
tion with Lavalin that we have become a dominantly French speaking 
firm." (p.5) 
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THEME II: HYDROELECTRIC ENGINEERING AND JAMES BAY 
MANAGEMENT 
There is no doubt that the James Bay project of the 1970's gave a great 
boost to the consulting engineering business in Quebec, not only 
hydroelectric, but the wide variety of other domains needed to reach 
and open up an undeveloped terrain. A major controversy arose over 
the overall management of the project, and while it of course influ­
enced the proportion of participation awarded to particular firms, it 
also illustrates a conflict inherent in a government-as-client situation, 
given a particular stage of evolution in the consulting engineering 
profession. That is, large engineering firms had increasingly come to 
conceive of their task as a total service, with management and engi­
neering services offered in the same package, whereas Hydro Quebec 
felt a responsibility both to increase its own engineering competence 
and to retain overall control, while keeping the provision of manage­
ment and of engineering services strictly separate. Put in the simplest 
way, the former view, exemplified by an SNC-Monenco-Janin bid, lost 
out to a team consisting of Hydro Quebec through its subsidiary SEBJ 
(Société d'énergie de la Baie James), the American giant Bechtel, and 
Lavalin. In what follows, the process of choice, affected of course by 
considerations of chronology, personality, and politics, is reflected in 
the reminiscences of some major participants. First, Robert Boyd: 
We [Hydro Quebec] had worked alot with SNC, ABBDL, and the others at 
Manic-Outardes, but there was one thing in which we were not so strong and 
that was cost control...We had to go at it so fast, you know: in '60 we took 
over Carillon from Acres, and Perini, the contractor from the U.S. who was 
chummy with Duplessis - from Carillon to Bersimis to Manic the succession 
of big jobs was so fast that we could not build up the proper competence at 
Hydro Quebec in management of cost control...We saw how Acres/Bechtel 
had done a good job at Churchill Falls...We didn't need Acres because ...we 
had our own [engineering] firms in Quebec (ABBDL,RSW,SNC). 
But we needed Bechtel for their experience in construction and cost control, 
and we planned that way. Of course the politicians took it a step further than 
I wanted. They wanted to give the management to Bechtel, to which I said, 
"Over my dead body! I like Bechtel but I like them working for me, not over 
me." 
...I said either Hydro Quebec or SEBJ will be the manager. That was a BIG 
fight, a very big fight, because some politicians had made the promise to 
Bechtel they would have the management...We had a big fight and eventually 
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I won that one. And that's where we got into a problem with SNC: they were 
supposed to be in the picture also very strongly - they wanted the manage­
ment also. SNC wanted the management, Bechtel was promised the manage­
ment, and I wanted Hydro Quebec and its subsidiary to be the 
manager....[When Rene Lévesque, as a newspaperman in 1972, asked why the 
HQ-Bechtel-Lavalin team] I said [among other things] the engineering firms 
we had, like SNC, ABBDL, RSW...should not be in management, because we 
needed them so much to do the engineering. One of the principles was: if 
you've got an engineering job, you don't get a management job. 
That's not evident, it wasn't evident then; if you're in engineering you're not in 
management. You can't do both unless you're the owner. (Robert Boyd, pp. 5-6) 
Boyd was clearly promoting a type of public-private collaboration not 
popular with most of the private firms at that time. 
As president of SNC at that juncture, Camille Dagenais was reluc­
tant to comment on the choice of team, but on the policy of separa­
tion between management and engineering, he said: 
I can only answer from where I stand; for the benefit of consulting engineer­
ing, and the environment in which we [work], which is the environment in 
which you have to be able to do the whole thing... from the point of view of 
making the consulting engineer companies in Quebec become larger and very 
important and capable of being competitive with some of the bigger ones out­
side, it was not a good move. You have to be able to do the management, and 
the engineering, and the whole job [From] the government's point of view, 
I suppose that they had many reasons to divide the work into many. (Camille 
Dagenais, SNC, June 1990, p.6) 
Jean-Paul Gourdeau, Dagenais' second in command at the time, also 
felt that to obtain jobs abroad, a combination of experience in large 
project management and engineering expertise was necessary. He 
mentioned other factors in the choice: 
The government decided that there should be a separate company, the energy 
corporation...the president was Mr. [Pierre] Nadeau. He decided that he want­
ed to have a complete separate team, and this is when we were asked to form a 
consortium ...we made an offer, and I guess there was a confrontation with 
Hydro Quebec...Mr. Nadeau lost out and Hydro Quebec decided that they 
wanted a new group, and since we [had been] asked to form a group with M. 
Nadeau, we couldn't be the fair-haired boy of the new group, and so we lost 
out. Like anything else, in a project like this you do your best, but there is no 
second prize; you either get the job or you don't. (Jean-Paul Gourdeau, p.5) 
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.mes Bay 
This map, from the LG2 Diary, shows the major sites targeted by Hydro 
Quebec from Manicouagan (1950's) to the future. The Saint Maurice River, 
which flows south into the St. Lawrence at Trois Rivières, between Montreal 
and Quebec on the north shore, after going over Shawinigan Falls, is not 
shown (Source: Société d'énergie de la Baie James, LG2 Diary, Frontispiece) 
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Robert Boyd's analysis of this transition included the following 
remark: "The government wanted to leave Hydro Quebec out of it, so 
they could have more of their fingers in it" (Boyd, p. 7) 
In contrast to the SNC-Monenco-Janin proposal, Lamarre and 
Couture describe small scale approaches to working with Hydro 
Quebec that eventually paid off in "the big enchilada" as Lamarre 
referred to it. He said: 
[In 1967-68] after a lot of pushing and a lot of discussion, we finally persuaded 
[Hydro Quebec] to give us something, so they could test us...no more than 3-5 
people working on that project, over a period of two or three years, but 
because the team was so small, I was with them almost all the time at Hydro 
Quebec, and it gave us access to the technical people there... 
When the James Bay project was announced in 1971....we were the underdog, 
and at that time SNC and Monenco and Janin had formed...a totally Canadian 
consortium...and they made two mistakes in their proposal: first, they exclud­
ed us -1 wanted to be with them but they said no - and the second thing, I 
guess that they wanted to take over the complete management of the job, and 
it was too much for Hydro Quebec to swallow, because they wanted to do the 
project, they wanted it to be an integrated team. (Bernard Lamarre, p.4) 
Couture, the member of Lavalin most closely involved in the James 
Bay project, recalls: 
First Lalonde & Valois at the end of the 1960's developed some good relation­
ships with Hydro Quebec, because I believe we were the first firm that looked 
at consulting work not as independent work, outside of Hydro Quebec, but we 
developed the concept of technical assistance in which we would use our engi­
neers and technicians mixed up with the engineers and technicians of Hydro 
Quebec. [Usually] when work was contracted out, the consulting engineer 
worked extremely independently from the technical staff of Hydro Quebec; 
they reported almost directly to the head of Hydro Quebec. [For us] it was pos­
sible to have this kind of a relationship where we would form a team coming 
from the expertise source of Hydro Quebec and the expertise source of the 
consulting practice...[this] helped us at the beginning of the '70's to get 
involved in the project as we did. 
[As for other reasons for the presence of Lavalin on the management team,] 
there were potentially three clients...SDBJ,..SEBJ...and Hydro Quebec. People 
aligned themselves according to who they thought would be in the driving 
seat...we chose to do most of our promotional work and develop our proposals 
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with Hydro Quebec, and as it turned out they were selected to direct the 
whole development, I think this was probably the most important factor in 
obtaining the assignment. (Armand Couture, p.3) 
Boyd, who was president of SEBJ (Hydro Quebec version), sums up the 
operation of the eventual team: 
The big responsibility of James Bay was getting this structure going and selling 
the idea of how it was going to work: first, you can't be an engineer and a 
manager;... [second] the work had to be done in French. Third: how to inte­
grate three firms like that: Hydro Quebec with its big hat; Bechtel was a bigger 
hat internationally, they thought everything they did was right; and Lavalin, 
who was really growing. I had to knock in their heads a lot: there's ONE com­
pany, SEBJ; we ALL wear the SEBJ hat, forget the other hats, and the way it's 
going to be done is the way we discuss, and this is OUR way. (Robert Boyd, 
p.7) 
The James Bay project undoubtedly provided a boost to consulting 
engineering in Montreal: to the many civil engineering firms involved 
in infrastructure; to the three principal hydroelectric firms - ABBDL, 
RSW, and, to a much lesser extent than hoped, SNC, whose involve­
ment included the LG2 powerhouse; but above all, to Lavalin. SNC 
and Monenco, both of whose former presidents have cited Bechtel as 
their model (Mulherin, p.6; Dagenais, p.4), had already participated in 
major projects overseas, and continued to do so; they also expanded 
in the oil and gas industries. 
Lavalin's participation in the James Bay project allowed it to grow -
financially, technologically, and geographically - to a position 
equalling and surpassing its Montreal competitors. By comparison 
with them, Lavalin was lacking in hydroelectric experience (which, 
according to the principle of separation of engineering and manage­
ment, would have been of little use anyway for James Bay); this lack 
was filled by the acquisition of Shawinigan Engineering in 1982, dur­
ing the lull following the completion of James Bay, phase 1. 
In summary, the most basic issue in the choice of management 
teams for James Bay I, aside from all the political considerations, 
appears to have been the conflict between the total service concept, 
which is analogous to the concept of "turnkey" plants and the "black 
box" view of technology, in which the expertise is exercised only by 
the chosen experts; and the concept of cooperation among different 
organisms, public and private, representing different political and 
entrepreneurial purposes, in the carrying out of a major project. 
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CONCLUSION: FORCED TOGETHERNESS 
The desire to work alone, to have complete control and responsibility 
for a project, as the simplest way to do an efficient job, was common 
to all of the firms. In cases where a firm needed new expertise, the 
method of spawning its own subsidiary or buying an orphan or dying 
firm, was common. In many other cases, joint ventures were formed 
where either political interests (e.g., host governments to Canadian 
firms working abroad) or technical requirements (e.g., hydroelectric 
experience in difficult climatic conditions) made it necessary to coop-
erate. 
Some projects were of such a grand scale that no one firm could do 
it, and be afterwards able to support the enormous staff that would be 
required to complete such projects. In order to obtain federal (e.g., 
CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency, EDC - Export 
Development Corporation) or international (e.g., World Bank) fund-
ing for projects abroad, cooperation has often been required, taking 
the form of a consortium. These have been seen as unattractive, but 
essential, means of obtaining projects. Some responses, when asked 
about the extent of participation in consortia: 
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As little as possible! We're big enough to swallow all the engineering firms in 
Canada..we probably have 15% of all the engineering manpower in 
Canada..we operate in all types of fields, so why should we join a consortium? 
...Unless there is a special reason...(Dufour, president of Lavalin International, 
p. 5) 
Let's put it this way. In some cases it's necessary. (Gourdeau, SNC, p. 7) 
[In the seventies] with the exception of the Malaysian work virtually every­
thing we [Shawinigan] did overseas or in Canada was in consortium with 
either Montreal Engineering or Acres or somebody else. It was a sad thing, but 
that's what happened. (Denovan, p.6) 
Many projects..can only be done that way, because the scope is big and the 
skills are very many...ten years ago, it was more that you had to put up with it. 
In the mid seventies there was no way [Bechtel] were going to work with any­
body else; that was part of their philosophy...When they did it the first time, 
it was because there was no other way for them to get the job. (Dagenais, SNC, 
p.7) 
Two major reasons cited for consortia were to meet the expense of 
the scale and/or difficulty of a project, and to facilitate the distribu­
tion of Canadian government support: 
Jack Hahn [from SNC, with whom Douglas Denovan went to school] used to 
say to me, "Doug, it's crazy. Here we are, Shawinigan, Monenco, Acres, we all 
go out competing on the same jobs overseas, and the Japanese, the Germans, 
the Dutch, the British, are coming in with a single national bid." ...We join 
hands to share the risk of the costs of bidding, because it costs money to get a 
job. 
Sometimes there's another motivation, that CIDA can't be handing out work 
to [any one company] all the timc.there'd be an outcry of abuse, patron­
age... [so] part of it is to make it easier for the Canadian government to help 
finance the project. (Denovan, p.6) 
The case of C.I.P.M. (Canadian International Project Management) 
demonstrates both the attempt to meet the expense of getting access 
to China, and the simplification of the distribution of Canadian gov­
ernment support. This ongoing consortium, which has done hydro­
electric studies including the Three Gorges project on the Yangtze 
River in China, has included SNC, Acres, and Shawinigan, plus Hydro 
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Quebec and B.C. Hydro. (Monenco dropped out several years ago, 
because of philosophical differences; according to Mulherin, p. 6, "We 
always approached things on the cheap, and those guys, it seemed to 
me, wanted to do things in a grandiose manner, and hire very high 
paid executives who would run around the world and search for pro­
jects.") 
In addition to scale considerations and facilitation of government 
financing, Dagenais notes a more political factor that has increased 
the use of consortia: 
Political nationalism in many countries: engineers in Peru or other places are 
like us as we used to be, in 1953, when we were taking jobs away from Acres, 
saying, "Hey, this is Quebec, that firm is in Toronto." 
..those people down there are doing the same thing; so you have to form a 
consortium with the locals. We have an office in Tunisia now, with a local 
organization, and I don't think you can do work any more in those countries 
unless you organize that way. (Dagenais, p. 7) 
The larger Montreal firms have been in a position where, in the 
words of SNC's Gourdeau, "The market in Canada is not sufficient to 
warrant an organization like ourselves," (p.9); and yet they needed 
the financial and technical resources to compete with yet larger firms 
in the world market. The use of the consortium is one path to the 
necessary flexibility. 
But in the present case(s), it has not been enough. Lavalin's contin­
uing diversification hit a snag when it acquired a petrochemical firm 
Kemtec (formerly B.A.-Shawinigan, a subsidiary of Gulf Canada, 
which in turn was then owned by Gulf Oil U.S.; the Reichmanns 
bought Gulf Canada in 1985, and Lavalin picked up one of the left­
overs). When recession hit, the cash drain was too much, and the ulti­
mate outcome was the joining together of the two leading engineer­
ing firms. 
The merger of SNC and Lavalin, while sad for Lavalin, marks yet 
another leap in the spectacular rise of consulting engineering in 
Montreal. What had become the two largest firms of their kind in 
Canada became the fifth largest in the world. 
FACING THE FUTURE 
With Shawinigan, Lavalin, and SNC all wearing "one big hat" (to use 
Robert Boyd's phrase), the firm SNC-Lavalin will continue to evolve in 
concert and competition with other firms in its class. Several ques-
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tions arise as to the firm's future; we will make observations on only 
two: 
1 How will the corporate structures and cultures react to the merger, 
especially in the case of hydroelectric power engineering? 
2 What problems and opportunities will the relationship with Hydro 
Quebec present, in the context of the second phase of the James 
Bay project at the Grande Baleine/Great Whale River and else­
where? 
As to structural and cultural evolution, we can begin by noting 
some structural changes that have taken place: Bernard Lamarre and 
Marcel Dufour are now consultants located adjacent to SNC-Lavalin 
president Guy Saint-Pierre in the SNC building on Boulevard René 
Lévesque near Hydro Quebec; the energy and mega-project division, 
one of four major subdivisions of the company, called SNC-
Shawinigan, is located in the former Lavalin headquarters in the 
Laurentian Building a few blocks west on René Lévesque. It is far too 
soon to analyze structural change in any depth. 
A question of special interest to historians as "company genealo­
gists" is that of the process of fusing and/or clashing of cultures in 
company mergers. We may begin with the idea, common in the social 
sciences, that in the encounter between two previously separate cul­
tures, the process of acculturation may produce something entirely 
new, containing elements of the cultures of the old components; and 
creating a new entity which (depending upon the relative power of 
the two entities, and upon the desires of the managers) may or may 
not retain the characteristics of both components. 
We will take the culture of the now dominant SNC component as 
given: a more or less typical world-class, internationally and multicul-
turally oriented, bureaucratic organization operating in the consulting 
engineering, construction, and manufacturing sectors. The question 
of the survival of the Lavalin and Shawinigan identities is an interest­
ing one. 
As for Shawinigan, at least its name has been preserved, and as long 
as projects started before the merger continue, the group of engineers 
employed by the former Shawinigan-Lavalin subsidiary of Lavalin will 
function as before. It is only as new projects are begun that the cre­
ation of a new, fused identity will begin to form. 
An extremely useful perspective on this process was provided by an 
interview with Jo-Ann Paquet, whose career also reflects some impor­
tant tendencies in the evolution of the engineering profession. As rep­
resentative within SNC-Shawinigan of a group temporarily labelled 
"groupe corporatif en qualité," she works to monitor and improve 
what is often called in English "total quality management," a term 
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whose definition includes attention to interaction with the client, and 
to favorable working conditions for employees. While a discussion of 
this concept is out of place here, she stated strongly her conviction 
that "quality" is indeed something that must be managed, or fostered; 
it is not something that occurs automatically (as anyone who has 
experienced arrogance in "expert" consultants, or stultifying working 
conditions, will testify). Her particular mandate is to smoothe the 
transition as SNC and Shawinigan engineers begin working together 
on new projects. 
Jo-Ann Paquet's career illustrates the speed with which the modern 
engineer may move into adminstration; graduating in metallurgical 
engineering from Laval in 1983, she worked only four years in that 
field with Alcan before entering the field of quality control, or quality 
management, joining Lavalin in 1990. 
Disons que je n'ai pas la réputation d'être le parfait stéréotype de l'ingénieur. 
Je suis peu intéressée par les machines; je suis beaucoup plus attirée par les 
gens qui opèrent les machines. C'est la raison fondamentale qui m'a amené à 
m'intéresser à la gestion de la qualité. 0-A Paquet, April 28, 1992) 
The career trajectory by which the management of people succeeds 
the process of producing designs, specification, and machines as the 
principal interest of engineers, is increasingly common as the relative 
importance of project design rather than planning the manipulation of 
material objects becomes the central function of an engineering firm. 
A tendency toward democratization of the workplace was also evi­
dent in the fact that the Association québécoise de la qualité (of 
whose Montreal region Jo-Ann Paquet was president at the time of 
our interview) includes members from retail stores with three employ­
ees as well as from firms the size of Bell Canada. 
An aspect of "company culture" which emerged from several visits 
to Lavalin is the unusually widespread prevalence of beauty and care 
in the design and decoration of the workplace, and the prominent 
position given to the visual arts, leading-edge and modern as well as 
traditional, not just in the boardrooms but throughout the building, 
extending to a public gallery in the basement. Art had clearly been 
more than a good investment and a way of making corporate clients 
feel more at home in the executive offices as is the case with many 
companies. At the second interview (April 28, 1992), when Bernard 
Lamarre had slightly (but not much) more time than he had had as 
president of Lavalin, to give to questions not strictly of a business 
nature, we asked him whether this pervasive evidence of the love of 
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art had been a self-conscious plan or had just happened. It emerged 
that, while it had started as a hobby, it had assumed an important 
role in company management: 
It started as a personal interest...my wife, our family, were always interested in 
art, especially the visual arts; as a young couple we visited museums...I became 
almost an art addict. At first we kept that for ourselves, but later - you cannot 
separate yourself and have it in your home, and come into the office where it 
is completely different. So we started to bring some works of art into the 
office. When I brought Leo Rosshandler in, it was a very definite policy to try 
to integrate works of art within the work environment. 
..[we thought that] if we brought in meaningful works of art, by interesting 
the personnel and raising their curiosity in visual arts, they would also have 
curiosity for other forms of art...Of course the first time we brought in modern 
works of art, they thought we had fallen on our heads.. 
You know, they were not used to that, didn't have much contect with it, but 
they started to ask themselves questions - what was behind the abstract, and 
all that - from that we went to maybe music.If you are curious about art, 
then you start also to be curious about what you do every day of your life in 
engineering, and you start questioning the methods you have been applying 
all the time; maybe there is something that could be changed... it's creating a 
very intensive intellectual debate; it's good for everybody, on the art side and 
on the technical and business side. (Lamarre, SNC-Lavalin, April 28, 1992) 
It seemed to us, after seeing this company in operation in 1989 and 
1990, that Lamarre and his associates had set (and presumably will 
continue to set, in other ways), an example of the possibility of a 
humane, culturally rich environment in a technological, traditionally 
arid and forbidding, part of the economy. 
Lamarre went on to tell how, even before he had a public gallery in 
the basement, they arranged travelling exhibitions, to make Quebec 
artists known in the west, and western artists known in Quebec - "at 
least, to bring those two solitudes together on something on which 
there was not any big discussion....you know, you don't knock heads 
off with art. You don't need to speak French, or English, to communi­
cate..." Thus art was a instrument of change, not only within the 
company environment, but in the surrounding society. 
We will address only briefly the second question posed about the 
future of the combined firms in their relationship to Hydro Quebec, 
particularly in reference to James Bay, phase two, the Grande 
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Baleine/Great Whale project. Here the ecological factor has become 
much more prominent than in the past. In the sixties, seventies, and 
eighties, and well before, great dreams of power production as an eco­
nomic engine of development were realized. With this actualization 
came the evidence of the invasive effects on the social and ecological 
balances that had existed before these developments. The James Bay 
agreement of 1975, which temporarily resolved, or at least contained, 
the conflict between ways of life and holders of various kinds of prop­
erty rights in the region of the La Grande project, will have to be suc­
ceeded by a new set of arrangements, in which local and international 
environmental groups are playing a more visible role than before. 
The same set of questions, revolving around the conflicts between 
the forces of development and the interests of the ecologically affect­
ed, will arise (have arisen) in connection with the Yangtze River Three 
Gorges project, in which SNC-Lavalin is involved with many others, 
and which implies the displacement of a much denser population. 
Many of the people interviewed, retired or not, will no doubt play 
important parts - none more so than Armand Couture, as Lavalin's 
representative for James Bay I, and as president and chief operating 
officer of Hydro Quebec now. Those histories, in Canada, as in China 
and elsewhere, remain to be lived, as well as written. 
* * * 
Oral history can provide an evocative supplement to the study of the 
technological, as well as financial, cultural, and other exchange 
processes that underlie the metropolitan nature of Montreal. Oral his­
tory permits investigators to get a feel for the real-world, quotidian 
operations of large, as well as small, firms, and to understand differ­
ences not always reflected in financial reports, business pages, and 
economic analyses. 
In the present case, our hope is that the extraordinarily long and 
strong internationalist tradition of SNC, and the equally extraordinary 
entrepreneurship, including in partcular the way in which the cre­
ation of a consciousness of and love for the visual arts has been 
encouraged to permeate the entire corporate culture and hierarchical 
structure at Lavalin, will both be retained in the future of SNC-Lavalin. 
In looking at the role of Hydro Quebec in the rise of consulting 
engineering in Montreal, we have not attempted to analyse or assess 
the behaviour of Hydro Quebec itself (this is being done at CREDIT 
and elsewhere). We have instead emphasized the USE made by 
Montreal firms of the opportunities and environment provided by the 
policies of Hydro Quebec and of the Quebec and federal governments 
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between 1944 and 1992. Plans, actions, and events determining the 
next chapters are already in process, and it will be interesting to see 
what forces in the local, regional, national, North American, and 
world environments - social, political, economic, and ecological - will 
dominate the process, and the discussion in the media, of the contin­
uation of the story told here. 
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWEES & INTERVIEWS 
Tape #1, July 27, 1989, 1 hr.: 
GEORGE H. SCRUTON, b. Ottawa, Ont., 1926; Queen's University; 
engineer, Shawinigan/Lavalin. Originally with Shawinigan Water & 
Power, Scruton became one of the employee-owners of Shawinigan 
Engineering upon its parent's acquisition by Hydro Quebec in 1963. 
He has remained with the firm through its acquisition by Lavalin in 
1982. The interview covers his career and it reflection of aspects of 
changes for consulting engineering over this period: from private to 
public utilities; from project- to system-oriented power engineering; 
toward expansion across Canada and abroad; toward development of 
joint ventures, and toward dominance of French-speaking firms in 
Quebec. 
Tape #2, August 14,1989, 1 1/2 hrs.: 
ROBERT A. BOYD, b. Sherbrooke 1918; Ecole Polytechnique; retired 
president, Hydro Quebec. Boyd talks of his classical education, Ecole 
Polytechnique, and career at Hydro Quebec from 1944, the year of its 
founding, through his presidency of the Société d'énergie de la Baie 
James (1972-77) and of Hydro Quebec (1978-1981). He recalls his 
efforts, as a French Canadian engineer, to introduce the use of French 
in operations. He tells how, as general manager, he worked for the 
integration of the power companies and cooperatives after 1963, and 
recalls taking part in negotiations for Hydro Auebec's use of Churchill 
Falls power. He discusses how the Lesage government's policy of con­
tracting out engineering work fostered such firms as SNC, ABBDL, and 
RSW in the hydroelectric field, and Lavalin in project management; 
and how firms were chosen to play various roles in the James Bay pro­
ject. He comments on the past, present, and future of Hydro Quebec, 
particularly in relation to engineering. 
Tape #3, August 25,1989, 1 hr.: 
BERNARD LAMARRE, b. Chicoutimi, 1931; Ecole Polytechnique, 
Imperial College of Science and Technology, London; president, 
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Lavalin. Lamarre recalls his youth in the Saguenay, education at 
College Mont St.-Louis, Ecole Polytechnique, and in London, and his 
marriage to the "boss's daughter," as events preceding his career with 
Lalonde Valois (founded 1936; now Lavalin) which he has headed 
since the early 1960's. He mentions his involvement in such major 
Montreal projects as the Louis-Hippolyte Lafontaine Tunnel and Place 
Bonaventure. He tells about the process of obtaining and carrying out, 
with Hydro Quebec and Bechtel, the role of project management for 
the James Bay project from 1972. Lavalin's expansion, including the 
acquisition of subsidiaries from Photosur in 1968 to 
Shawinigan/Lavalin in 1982, is discussed. 
Tape #4, September 15, 1989, 1 hr.: 
MARCEL DUFOUR, b. La Malbaie 1925; Ecole Polytechnique, Harvard; 
president of Lavalin International. Dufour recalls his education at 
Ecole Polytechnique and at Harvard in soil mechanics; his early work 
at Shawinigan Engineering and his career with the Lavalin subsidiary 
National Boring and Sounding, which specializes in soil work, and has 
expertise in underwater projects. Dufour discusses reasons for and 
characteristics of Lavalin's expansion overseas (projects include roads 
in West Africa, ports in Indonesia, natural gas plants in the U.S.S.R.). 
Other topics include the acquisition of Shawinigan/Lavalin; the 
nature of competition in the international market for engineering ser­
vices; and the differences for a young engineer between the present 
and the 1950's. 
Tape #5, September 22, 1989, 1 hr.: 
ARMAND COUTURE, b. Quebec 1930; Laval; vice-president Lavalin. 
Couture recalls his beginnings in Quebec city; early career including 
work-study combinations: National Harbours Board/master's degree at 
Laval; Fenco/ further study at UC Berkeley. He helped set up the con­
sulting firm Per Hall, which collaborated on the Lafontaine Tunnel; 
this led to his joining Lavalin. Couture discusses interaction with 
Hydro Quebec during and after Lavalin's selection as part of the James 
Bay management team; his personal role as Lavalin's representative, 
and his responsibility for the negotiations on the environment and 
with the native people. Couture also discusses the reasons for the pur­
chase of Shawinigan Engineering, of which he was in charge. He men­
tions the Three Gorges project in China, and summarizes the evolu­
tion of the nature of the organization of the work done by large con­
sulting firms over the last few decades. 
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Tape #6, May 16, 1990, 1 hr.: 
JEAN-PAUL GOURDEAU, b. Quebec 1925; Laval/Ecole Polytechnique, 
Harvard; chairman, SNC. As well as his early life and education, 
Gourdeau, tells of his ten years in the Quebec department of health, 
followed by his hiring by SNC in 1961 to set up a municipal engineer­
ing department. He tells of SNC's multicultural nature; of the compa­
ny's succession from Surveyer, Nenniger, and Chenevert to a broader 
partnership, employee ownership, and public, employee-controlled 
ownership. He notes the change from engineering services by disci­
plines to "total service." He analyses the reasons for SNC-Monenco-
Janin's loss of the project management contract for James Bay. SNC's 
international expansion, development of subsidiaries, joint ventures, 
consortia such as Canatom, and venture projects are mentioned. 
Gourdeau tells about the development of core areas in addition to 
engineering-construction in order to counteract cycles in engineering 
business - most prominently defence manufacture. Research and 
development is being pursued in environmental technologies. The 
selection of Guy St. Pierre as president in 1989 is described. Gourdeau 
mentions SNC's contributions to Montreal, and summarizes the 
growth of Quebec firms like SNC and the challenges facing such firms 
which are larger than the Canadian market alone can support. 
Tape #7, May 24, 1990, 1 hr.: 
J.K.C. ("CON") MULHERIN, b. Grand Falls, New Brunswick, 1925; 
University of New Brunswick; president of Montreal 
Engineering/Monenco 1974-1990. Besides his youth and education 
during World War II, Mulherin describes meeting the Killams, of 
Montreal Engineering's parent Royal Securities Corporation, after 
joining the firm in 1946. The company's Maritime connection, 
through Professor Earle Turner at UNB, and other from Killam down, 
and its Alberta connection, through Killam's Calgary Power 
Company, are mentioned. Mulherin tells of his early assignments, 
which were among Monenco's first for outside clients: power develop­
ments in the North West Territories, Yukon, and northern Quebec 
(Iron Ore Company of Canada). He outlines Monenco's early role in 
Churchill Falls, and limited role in James Bay. Aspects of the process 
of expansion (international work beyond that done for Killam's cen­
tral and South American utilities; joint ventures with Shawinigan 
Engineering and others; entry into the oil and gas industry) are men­
tioned, as the successive stages of reorganization following Killam's 
death in 1955: replacement of the longtime leadership of Geoffrey 
Gaherty, Denis Stairs, Frederick Krug, and Harry Thompson, by an 
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employee-owned company headed by Chris Ritchie in the early 
1960's; public ownership in 1969; regionalization in 198-2; and pur­
chase of a controlling interest in Monenco in 1988 by Majestic 
Contractors, a subsidiary of the U.S. construction firm Perini. 
Tape #8, 8a, May 25, 1990, 1 1/2 hrs. 
J. DOUGLAS DENOVAN, b. Outremont, 1925; McGill; engineer, 
Shawinigan Engineering-Shawinigan Lavalin, 1948-1988. Denovan 
recalls his early life and education, and his forty-year career with 
Shawinigan Engineering. His acquaintance with the company is 
enhanced by the fact that he became the son-in-law of Richard A. 
Heartz, who began with the company in 1920 and was its president 
(1951-61) and chairman (1961-71) during the crucial years of its tran­
sition from a subsidiary of Shawinigan Water & Power to an indepen­
dent, employee-owned company, a process which Denovan describes. 
Denovan also tells of his early project experiences, Shawinigan's 
expansion to outside clients, international projects such as a 
Malaysian hydroelectric development aided by CIDA, extensive partic­
ipation in consortia under the presidency of Ken Gray (an Australian 
recruited for nuclear work in India) during the 1970's. The unsuccess­
ful reorganization of Shawinigan Engineering into the Shawinigan 
Group headquartered in Toronto in 1977, the acquisition of the com­
pany by Lavalin in 1982, and its likely disappearance, are mentioned. 
Tape #9, 9a, June 11, 1990, 1 1/2 hrs. 
CAMILLE A. DAGENAIS, b. Montreal 1920; Ecole Polytechnique; for­
mer president and chairman, SNC. Dagenais describes his youth in 
Montreal's Little Burgundy, his education at St. Henri high school and 
Ecole Polytechnique, night studies at HEC, and early jobs at C-I-L and 
H.J. Doran, leading to employment, partnership and in 1966, presi­
dency of SNC. He recalls the three original partners, Surveyer (founder 
in 1911), Nenniger and Chenevert; and sketches his own involvement 
with large dams, most notably Manic 5 and Iddiki in India. He 
describes the difficult shift from partnership to employee-owned com­
pany during the 1960's. He analyses provincial and federal roles in the 
growth of consulting engineering (as president of the Association of 
Consulting Engineers of Canada in 1967). He tells how the engineer­
ing, procurement, and construction management roles were distrib­
uted in various cases, emphasizing the increasing importance, for 
time and cost efficiency, of unified control over a project. Other top­
ics include SNC's international work, its history of industrial, especial­
ly metallurgical, process work, its defence manufacturing business, 
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and research and development efforts. His own proudest memories 
(including a video tribute on his retirement as chairman in 1986), and 
his relationship with colleague and successor Jean-Paul Gourdeau, are 
recalled. Finally, he pays tribute to Chris Ritchie, president of 
Monenco in the 1960's and early 1970's, whose contributions to 
Canadian engineering Dagenais feels have not been sufficiently recog­
nized. 
Tape #10, April 28, 1992 
BERNARD LAMARRE (update) recalls the reasons, process, and conse­
quences of the merger between SNC and Lavalin, the importance of 
art in the Lavalin firm, the Three Gorges project in China, and 
Armand Couture's move to Hydro Quebec. 
Tape #11. April 28, 1992 
JO-ANN PAQUET, b. Baie Comeau, Quebec; engineering degree 
Université Laval 1983; engineer with Alcan, Qualisys, and Lavalin; 
representative of the "groupe corporatif de la qualité" to SNC-
Lavalin's division of energy and megaprojects (SNC-Shawinigan). Jo-
ann Paquet describes her career, the structure of SNC-Lavalin, the 
Association québécoise de la qualité, and the need for management of 
quality in the working environment and in service to the clientele. 
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